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ABSTRACT
We conduct an experiment with commercial bank loan ocers to test how perfor-
mance compensation aects risk-assessment and lending. High-powered incentives
lead to greater screening eort and more protable lending decisions. This eect is,
however, muted by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features
of loan ocer compensation contracts. We nd that career concerns and personality
traits aect loan ocer behavior, but show that the response to incentives does not
vary with traits such as risk-aversion, optimism or overcondence. Finally, we present
evidence that incentive contracts distort the assessment of credit risk, even among
trained professionals with many years of experience.
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The eect of performance-based compensation on risk-taking is of fundamental importance
in nance.1 However, the precise mechanism through which nancial incentives aect risk-
assessment and risk-taking remains poorly understood. Existing research has established
that bank lending is responsive to the external economic environment (see, for example,
Dell'Ariccia and Marquez [2006] or Keys et al. [2010])2 and, more recently, that agency
problems within a bank may aect credit allocation (Liberti and Mian [2009], and Hertzberg,
Liberti and Paravisini [2010]). By contrast, there is little evidence on individual responses to
performance-based compensation, a key instrument banks may use to inuence the decisions
of loan ocers tasked with making actual lending decisions.3
Linking compensation practices to lending decisions is dicult, for at least two impor-
tant reasons. First, incentive structures are endogenously determined by nancial institu-
tions, yielding standard identication problems. Second, even setting identication chal-
lenges aside, the data typically available in observational studies, such as lending, interest
income, and write-os, are often insucient to distinguish between competing hypotheses.
To surmount these challenges, this paper uses a high-stakes eld experiment4 with com-
mercial bank loan ocers in India, which enables us to present direct evidence on the eect
of performance-based compensation on risk-assessment and lending decisions. In the exper-
1The impact of incentives on risk-taking has been cited as a key factor in many nancial crises that
were preceded by a lending boom. See Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann [2010], Fahlenbrach and Stulz [2012],
Acharya, Litov and Sepe [2013] for a discussion of incentives and risk-taking in the run-up to the recent
global nancial crisis. Devlin [1989] and Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche [2001] highlight the role of
employee incentives and supply side factors in the Latin American debt crisis. For a general discussion of
incentives and risk-taking at banks, see also \Crazy compensation and the crisis". Alan Blinder, The Wall
Street Journal. May 28, 2009.
2For evidence on credit booms and screening incentives see also Dell'Ariccia, Igan and Laeven [2012].
Theoretical approaches have modeled variation in screening standards as a result of herding, business cycle
factors (Kiyotaki and Moore [1997]), or limited screening capacity of banks (Berger and Udell [2004]).
3See Freixas and Rochet [2008] for a discussion of incentive problems specic to lending. For reviews of
incentive compensation in rms see Baker, Jensen and Murphy [1988] and Prendergast [1999].
4The design of our experiment combines elements of a eld and lab experiment. We follow the classication
of proposed by Harrison and List [2004], who refer to this experimental design as a \framed eld experiment".
1iment, loan ocers were paid to review and assess actual loan applications, making 14,675
lending decisions under exogenously assigned incentives. We pinpoint the relationship be-
tween compensation and lending decisions by exogenously varying the incentive contracts
faced by loan ocers and evaluate three classes of incentive schemes: (i) volume incentives
that reward origination, (ii) low-powered incentives that reward origination conditional on
performance and (iii) high-powered incentives that reward performance and penalize default.
While much of the literature on performance-based compensation in banking and nance
has focused on incentives for risk-taking provided to top management,5 this paper explores
the hypothesis, often advanced in the aftermath of the global nancial crisis, that non-
equity incentives for loan originators, such as commissions, can play an important role in
determining the fate of a bank's lending operation.6 Indeed, providing appropriate incentives
to employees at the lower tiers of a commercial bank's corporate hierarchy is a dicult
problem: their very responsibility is to collect information that the bank cannot otherwise
observe, making monitoring dicult. They enjoy limited liability, and may have dierent
risk and time preferences than the bank's shareholders.
The design of our experiment closely matches the loan approval process of low- docu-
mentation loans in an emerging credit market, and has several features that are particularly
well-suited for studying the question at hand. First, while still novel in nance, the use
of randomized experiments has grown rapidly in other areas of economics, in large part
because they allow clear tests of causal relationships. Our unique experimental approach,
which brings professional loan ocers with many years of experience in credit assessment
into a controlled laboratory environment, allows us to track aspects of loan ocer behav-
ior that would normally be unobservable to a bank or econometrician and allows for the
5See Jensen and Murphy [1990] and Murphy [1999] for an overview of this literature.
6Acharya, Litov and Sepe [2013] note that the literature on executive compensation disagrees about the
eect of performance pay on risk-taking and argues that these conicting results could be due to an omitted
factor, such as the impact of non-executive compensation on risk-taking.
2causal identication of the impact of monetary incentives on loan ocer behavior. By using
a population of experienced loan ocers, our design also accounts for the important con-
cern that trained professionals may behave dierently from non-professionals in controlled
experimental environments (see, for example, Palacios-Huerta and Volji [2008]).
Second, by design, our experiment focuses on the lending decision and allows us to
isolate the impact of performance pay on the quality of initial screening from other channels
that may aect lending, such as the collection of soft information or the degree of ex-post
monitoring.7 Finally, participants completed a set of standard psychological tests, similar to
those used in the literature on managerial characteristics and decision-making (Malmendier
and Tate [2005], Graham, Harvey and Puri [2013]). We use this information to shed light
on the mechanism through which incentives aect loan ocer decisions, and to benchmark
the size of the eects. In particular, we examine whether monetary incentives aect lending
decisions directly or through their interaction with personality traits, such as overcondence,
conscientiousness or risk-aversion.
We present three main results. Our rst set of results documents the ecacy and limi-
tations of performance incentives in lending. We provide evidence that the structure of per-
formance incentives strongly aects screening eort, risk-assessment, and the protability of
originated loans. Loan ocers who are incentivized based on lending volume rather than
the quality of their loan portfolio originate more loans of lower average quality. By contrast,
high-powered incentives that reward loan performance and penalize bad lending decisions
cause loan ocers to exert greater screening eort, reduce exposure to loans with higher
perceived ex-ante credit risk, and induce signicantly more protable lending decisions while
leading only to a small reduction in lending volume. Relative to a baseline treatment with
low-powered incentives, high-powered incentives increase the probability that a bad loan is
7The distinction between screening, information production and ex-post monitoring is also a feature of
the real lending environment that is being replicated by our experiment, where these tasks are carried out
by separate employees, each facing their own wage schedule.
3detected and increase prots per originated loan by up to 3.5% of the median loan size; in
contrast, origination incentives lead to a substantial decline in the quality of originated loans
and reduce prots per loan by up to 5% of the median loan size. Although screening eort
is on average lower under pure volume incentives, it is worth noting that loan ocers do not
indiscriminately approve all applications, which suggests the presence of career concerns or
reputational motivations.8
Building on these results, we explore a number of constraints, inherent to any incentive
contract in lending, that may limit the ecacy of pay for performance. Consistent with the
predictions of a simple model of loan ocer decision-making, we nd that deferred compen-
sation attenuates the eectiveness of high-powered incentives. When incentive payments are
awarded with a three-month delay, our measures of costly screening eort decline by between
5% and 14%, and we document a corresponding but less pronounced decline in the quality of
originated loans. Notably, we nd that deferred compensation also moderates the negative
eect of incentive schemes that emphasize loan origination over the quality of originated
loans. Relaxing loan ocers' limited liability constraint (similar in spirit to giving a loan
ocer equity in the loan) induces greater screening eort and leads to more conservative
lending decisions, but has only a moderate eect on the protability of originated loans.
Second, we demonstrate that performance incentives have important eects on loan o-
cers' subjective perception of credit risk. We nd that loan ocers evaluating applications
under performance contracts that provide strong incentives for approval systematically in-
ate internal ratings they assign to the loans they process. While internal ratings are strongly
predictive of default under all incentive schemes, loan ocers facing volume incentives inate
risk ratings by as much as .3 standard deviations, irrespective of the underlying asset quality.
8To examine the role of non-monetary motivations in greater detail, Section IV. D explores the eect of
loan ocer characteristics on screening behavior. We nd evidence consistent with the presence of career
concerns, and identify several personality traits that make a loan ocer more likely to exert eort under
any monetary incentive. At the same time, we document that personality traits do not amplify loan ocers'
response to monetary incentives.
4Since incentives aect both risk ratings and approvals, the loan book approved under a per-
missive incentive scheme may therefore be of poorer quality but, based on internal ratings
alone, may in fact look less risky than a set of comparable loans approved under a more
conservative incentive contract.
Third, we provide evidence on the interaction between loan ocer characteristics and
the response to performance incentives, using data from psychometric tests administered to
a subset of the participants in our experiment. We show that loan ocer characteristics
have a strong eect on loan ocers' baseline level of screening eort. In particular, we nd
evidence that career concerns are a key non-monetary determinant of loan ocer behavior.
However, personality traits show only a weak interaction with monetary incentives. This
indicates that personality traits can be useful in identifying conscientious screeners, but are
unlikely to aect individual performance dierentially under alternative incentive schemes.
This paper contributes to several literatures. A growing body of research highlights the
importance of incentives for the transmission and use of information in lending (Hertzberg,
Liberti and Paravisini [2010], Qian, Strahan and Yang [2011], Berg, Puri and Rocholl [2012]).
Most closely related to our study, Agarwal and Ben-David [2012] exploit a change in the
compensation structure of a U.S. bank and show that volume incentives lead to greater
risk-taking and a deterioration in loan performance.
Second, we contribute to the literature on incentive compensation and risk-taking. Ex-
isting research in this area has focused almost exclusively on risk-taking among CEOs and
senior management (see Bebchuk and Spamann [2010], Bolton, Mehran and Shapiro [2010]
and Fahlenbrach and Stulz [2012]). Mechanisms similar in their eect to equity compensa-
tion for senior executives have been proposed to align the incentives of employees at lower
levels of a bank's corporate hierarchy with those of the bank.
Finally, our ndings add to the literature on lending in informationally opaque credit
markets. We examine the role of loan ocer eort and risk-assessment in an environment of
5high idiosyncratic risk (see Petersen and Rajan [1994], Berger, Klapper and Udell [2001]).
This is related to, but distinct from, the special role played by loan ocers in collecting soft
information, and monitoring borrowers following the disbursal of a loan.
While we feel that our setting oers important advantages {for example we are able
to study lending decisions amounting to the allocation of approximately US$ 88 million
in credit{ there are also two limitations worth mentioning. First, this paper studies one
specic lending model, often used in practice, where the loan ocer's primary function is
to screen loans, rather than to prospect for new clients, cross-sell other products, or gather
soft information.9 This allows us to devise a clean test for the impact of incentives that can
rule out multitasking concerns, but naturally connes the scope of our analysis to the loan
ocer's traditional screening role (Freixas and Rochet [2008]). Second, while the information
environment and lending process in our experiment match what's done in practice, one might
be concerned that studying lending decisions in a lab may lead us to underestimate the role
of career concerns and other longer term motivations that may inuence behavior in a real
lending environment. As we shall see, we do nd evidence of career concerns and other
reputational motivations. These should, however, be interpreted as lower bound estimates.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II. we discuss the basic
incentive problem in lending. Section III. describes the experimental setting and design.
Section IV. reviews the empirical strategy and presents our results, and Section V. concludes.
9The organizational form of the lending process is a distinct topic that is being explored in concurrent
work. See for example Paravisini and Schoar [2012].
6II. Performance Incentives in Lending
The potential for excessive10 and socially inecient risk-taking in response to poorly
designed incentive schemes has long been recognized. However, in many real-world settings,
rst-best contracts may be dicult to implement, as they require easily quantiable criteria
against which to measure and reward performance. The basic incentive problem in lending
arises from the fact that loan ocers are tasked with allocating the bank's capital based
on private information and risk-assessments that are not independently veriable by the
bank (Stein [2002]). This generates signicant scope for agency conict within the lending
institution and creates a strong rationale for the use of performance pay to align the risk
and time preferences of the bank's employees with those of the institution.
There are, however, several important constraints that generally preclude a bank from
oering a rst-best contract that would make a loan ocer a fully liable residual claimant
of the loans she originates. First, loan ocer eort is typically unobservable. Second, loan
ocers are necessarily protected by limited liability, as they take decisions on large amounts
of money, which typically far exceed the amount of any penalty a bank could enforce to deter
bad lending decisions. Third, the risk and time preferences of loan ocers are likely to dier
signicantly from those of the bank's shareholders. This may make it dicult to generate
eort with deferred pay conditioned on loan outcomes, rather than with an immediate bonus.
Finally, in a lending environment characterized by high aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, it
is dicult to reliably identify idiosyncratic defaults, which further complicates the use of
realized outcomes for the measurement of loan ocer screening eort and performance.
Where banks provide performance incentives, loan ocer compensation typically consists
10The literature does not provide a universally accepted denition of what constitutes \excessive" risk-
taking. In the context of our experiment, we dene excessive risk-taking with reference to the hypothetical
rst-best contract in which a loan ocer would be made a fully liable residual claimant of the loans she
originates. Excessive risk-taking denotes the case in which a loan ocer with rational beliefs takes higher
risk at a weakly lower rate of return than she would under the hypothetical rst-best contract.
7of a xed base salary plus a performance component. This performance component may place
weight on lending volume, loan performance, or a combination of the two.11
The debate on bank compensation has revolved around two main features of such incen-
tive contracts: rst, the incentive power of the contract, which is a function of the reward
for good and the penalty for bad decisions, and determines the perceived cost of originating
a loan that might become delinquent. Second, the often short time-horizon of compensation,
which may lead loan ocers to prioritize short-term gains over long-term loan performance.
Theoretical work on performance incentives in lending has been relatively scarce. Heider
and Inderst [2012] develop a model of relationship lending and analyze the optimal contract
when loan ocers, in addition to their traditional screening role, also act as \salespeople",
tasked with prospecting for new loans and producing soft information through the cultivation
of lending relationships. They show that in this setting, the optimal contract is a function of
the bank's competitive position, as well as the degree of private information the loan ocer
can conceal from her employer.
In contrast to this line of research, our experiment is set in a lending environment where
loan solicitation and approvals are strictly distinct, such that loan ocers approve loans with
little or no contact with the borrower. This enables us to rule out multitasking concerns in
the response to incentives. An additional advantage of this approach is that we can rank
incentive contracts oered in the experiment with reference to the hypothetical rst-best in
which a loan ocer would be made a fully liable residual claimant of the loans she originates.
The separation of information collection and loan approvals is common for a wide range
of nancial products, and especially prevalent in emerging markets where the small loan
11The U.S. Department of Labor, for example, describes the structure of loan ocer compensation con-
tracts as follows: \The form of compensation for loan ocers varies. [...] Some institutions pay only salaries,
while others pay loan ocers a salary plus a commission or bonus based on the number of loans originated."
(See http://www/bls.gov/oco/ocos018.htm, as also cited in Heider and Inderst [2012]). Examples of spe-
cic compensation schemes that reward loan ocers based on lending volume or loan performance are also
discussed in Berg, Puri and Rocholl [2012] and Paravisini and Schoar [2012].
8sizes, relative to the high xed cost of screening, often rule out the use of an expensive
relationship lending model that relies on repeated personal interaction with the client. This
places greater importance on incentives at the time of the initial screening decision, which
is the focus of our analysis.
In this paper, we study the impact of performance pay in lending in the context of an
experiment with commercial bank loan ocers in India. The design of our experiment builds
on a simple model of loan ocer decision making, outlined in the Internet Appendix,12 in
which loan ocer behavior depends on both nancial incentives and non-monetary reputa-
tional concerns. Specically, we assume that in addition to monetary rewards, loan ocers
care about the possibility that their actions may aect others' inference about their type.
This is the standard approach suggested by a growing literature on how to model behavior
in experiments with real subjects (see Harrison and List [2004] and Levitt and List [2007]).
Our theoretical framework makes four basic predictions about the eect of performance
pay on loan ocer behavior: rst, origination incentives, as often employed by commercial
banks, lead to indiscriminate lending, low eort and high defaults. By contrast, high-powered
incentives that reward protable lending and penalize default result in greater screening
eort, but more conservative lending. Second, deferred compensation reduces the power of
performance-based incentives. Third, relaxing a loan ocer's limited liability constraint, for
example through a contract with a \claw-back" provision, unambiguously increases eort.
Finally, eort under any contract is higher, and may be independent of monetary rewards,
12We follow, in particular, Levitt and List [2007], who propose a model in which an experimental subject
optimizes a utility function that is additively separable in the monetary and non-monetary arguments: \The
choice of action aects the agent through two channels. The rst eect is on the individual's wealth [...], the
second eect is the non-pecuniary moral cost or benet associated with [the] action. [...] More generally,
we have in mind that decisions which an individual views as immoral, anti-social or at odds with her own
identity (Akerlof and Kranton(2000, 2005)) may impose important costs on the decision maker)". This
model is suciently general to encompass a range of non-monetary motivations including career concerns,
the desire for social status and more general reputational motivations. See also Prendergast [1999] and Bloom
and Van Reenen [2011] for evidence from the literature on personnel economics, and Bandiera, Barankay and
Rasul [2011] on non-monetary incentives in eld experiments with rms using real employees as subjects.
9if loan ocers have reputational concerns.
III. Experimental Context and Design
A. Setting
We designed a `framed' eld experiment that closely matches the underwriting process
for unsecured small enterprise loans in India. In the experiment, loan ocers recruited from
the active sta of several commercial banks evaluate credit applications in the context of a
controlled lab experiment under exogenously assigned incentives.
The les assessed in the experiment consist of real, previously processed loan applications.
Each le contains all information available to the bank at the time that the loan was rst
evaluated. The distribution of loan les evaluated by loan ocers in the experiment is
matched to the distribution of good and bad loans participants would expect to see in a real
lending environment. This distribution was elicited using a pilot survey of 30 loan ocers
prior to the main experiment.
An especially attractive feature of this experimental design is that it allows us to draw on
a population of highly experienced loan ocers and observe their behavior and decisions to a
level of detail that would be dicult to achieve outside a controlled laboratory environment.
In the analysis, we use this feature of the experiment to estimate the causal impact of alter-
native incentive schemes, as well as the interaction of monetary incentives with measurable
loan ocer attitudes and personality traits. This allows us to provide causal evidence on the
channel through which incentives aect loan ocer behavior.
While lending decisions in the experiment were hypothetical, in the sense that all loans
had been previously processed by a bank and their realized outcome had been observed,
loan ocers received only information that was available to the bank at the original time of
10application. Since we observe the performance of all evaluated loans, we were able to pay
participants performance incentives, based on their lending decision and the realized outcome
of the loan applications they approve. The experimental treatments vary the magnitude and
the time horizon of these conditional payments to change the terms of the incentive contract
faced by loan ocers participating in the experiment.
One potential concern with our experimental design is that it might not fully account for
the role of soft information in loan giving. We note, however, that the aim of our experiment
is to isolate the impact of incentives on screening behavior and lending decisions. In order
to do this, we were careful to choose a loan product whose risk prole is determined by the
quality of the initial screening decision (rather than ex-post monitoring or soft information
obtained through relationship lending).
We focus on lending decisions for \mass market" loans to small businesses, as an example
of a loan product for which sales and origination channels are strictly distinct. Loans of this
type are sourced by sales agents in the eld, who collect all necessary client information,
which is then forwarded to the bank's loan ocers for approval. Loan ocers do not interact
with the client directly, cannot conduct interviews, and have no other way of collecting
soft information. By focusing on rst-time borrowers, we remove the potential inuence of
soft information generated over time. This allows for a clean test that isolates changes in
screening behavior from other channels through which incentives might aect lending. By
the same token, our results should be interpreted with care when applied to an environment
where loan ocers and are incentivized on tasks beyond loan screening.
In order to ensure that monetary incentives in the experiment were perceived as salient,
we calibrated expected payouts to the approximate hourly wage of the median participant,
a public sector loan ocer with ten years of experience in banking. The remainder of this
section describes the database of loans used in the experiment, the population of loan ocers
and the experimental protocol.
11B. Experimental Design
B.1 Loan Ocers
Loan ocers were recruited from the sta of several leading private and public sector
commercial banks in India. We report summary statistics for the population of participating
loan ocers in Table I, columns [1] to [4]. The median loan ocer in our sample is a public
sector bank employee who is 35 years old, and has 10 years of work experience. In Table I,
columns [5] to [8] we report comparable characteristics from a sample of all loan ocers from
a major commercial bank in the region where our experiment takes place. The descriptive
statistics indicate that our sample is quite representative of this reference population in
terms of age, rank and experience. In addition to their participation in the experiment,
loan ocers completed a series of tests of attitudes and personality traits, commonly used
in the literature on psychology and behavioral economics. Summary statistics of these tests
are reported in Panel B of Table I. Additional details on the measurement of loan ocer
attitudes and personality traits are provided in the Internet Appendix.
[Place Table I about here]
B.2 Database of Loans
As a basis for the experiment, we requested a random sample of loan applications from
a large commercial lender in India and received 676 loan les. These loan les contain all
information available at the time the application was rst processed, and are matched with
at least nine months of repayment history for each loan.13 The information contained in each
loan application can be grouped into the following categories, corresponding to the sections
of the Lender's standard application format: (1) basic client information including a detailed
13More than 90% of all defaults occur during the rst ve months of a loan's tenure, so that our default
measure allows for a relatively precise measurement of loan quality.
12description of the client's business, (2) list of documents and verication, (3) balance sheet
and (4) income statement. In addition, participants in the experiment had access to three
types of background checks for each applicant: a site visit report on the applicant's (5)
business and (6) residence and (7) a credit bureau report.14
Our sample consists of uncollateralized small business loans to self-employed individuals,
with a ticket size between Rs 150,000 (US$ 3,000) and Rs 500,000 (US$ 10,000).15 We
consider only term loans to new borrowers, many of whom are rst-time applicants for a
formal loan.16 The median loan in our database has a tenure of 36 months, a ticket size of
Rs 283,214 (US$ 6,383) and a monthly installment of Rs 9,228. (US$ 208).
Based on the Lender's proprietary data on loan repayment, we classify credit les into
performing and non-performing loans. Following the standard denition, we classify a loan
as delinquent if it has missed two or more monthly payments and remains 60+ days overdue.
To calculate the protability of a loan, we subtract the disbursal amount from the discounted
stream of repayments.17 To achieve as representative a sample as possible, we also include a
subset of les from clients who applied, but were turned down by the Lender. Throughout
the analysis, we report results disaggregated by non-performing and declined loans and show
that our results are unaected by the classication of loans declined ex-ante by the Lender.
Summary statistics for the sample of loan les are reported in the Internet Appendix,
Table D.II. The comparison between the sample of ex-post performing and non-performing
loans indicate that loan les indeed contain information that makes it possible to infer loan
quality, suggesting that there are returns to eort in this setting.
14We focus on loan applications from new customers. A credit bureau report was therefore only available
for 66% of the loans in our sample.
15To rule out vintage eects and ensure consistency in the initial screening standards applied to loans used
in the experiment, we restrict our sample to loans originated in 2009 Q1 and 2009 Q2.
16Since none of the loans in our sample are collateralized, they are priced at an annual interest rate of
between 15 and 30 per cent. We control for the variation in interest rates by including loan xed eects.
17We estimate the Lender's net prot per loan as the net present value of the disbursal plus repayments
including interest, discounted by 8%, the approximate rate on Indian commercial paper between January 1
and December 31, 2009, and assuming a 10% recovery on defaulted loans.
13B.3 Experimental Protocol
The experimental procedure and presentation of information were designed to closely
resemble the actual work environment of the representative loan ocer.1819Incentive treat-
ments, as described in Section B.4, were randomly and individually assigned at the loan
ocer and session level. Loan ocers were invited to an introductory session and then par-
ticipated in up to 15 sessions of the experiment, in which they evaluated a set of six randomly
assigned loans under a given incentive scheme. Within each session of the experiment, the
sequence of loan les was randomly assigned,20 but the ratio of performing, non-performing
and declined loans was held constant at four performing loans, one non-performing loan and
one loan declined by the Lender. We chose this ratio to match the distribution that loan
ocers reported experiencing in their workplaces.
At the start of each session, loan ocers were assigned to an incentive treatment, re-
ceived a one-on-one introduction to the incentive scheme in place and completed a short
questionnaire to verify comprehension. Loan ocers then began the loan rating exercise in
which they were asked to assess a series of loan les, using a customized software interface.
For every loan le under review, the loan evaluation software reproduced each section of the
application on a separate tab on the loan ocer's screen: this included a description of the
applicant's business, balance sheet, trade reference, site visit report, document verication
and credit bureau report when available. Each session of the experiment was scheduled to
last one hour, although participants could nish early or late if they so chose.
18Harrison, List and Towe [2007] point out that laboratory behavior may not match eld behavior when
eliciting risk attitudes (\background risk"). In contrast to that study, we use within-subject variation,
and the inclusion of loan ocer xed-eects may reduce the importance of heterogeneous perceptions of
background risk from dierent subjects.
19The literature on experiments in economics has pointed out that Hawthorne eects might obscure be-
havior in experiments that occur under observation (see Levitt and List [2007] and Levitt and List [2011] for
a discussion). Note that the only feature that changed in from session to session in our experiments was the
compensation scheme, so that any constant \experimenter demand" eects would not aect our estimates.
20This was done to ensure that estimates of loan performance would not be biased by factors such as
variation in the quality and extent of information contained in the application le.
14While reviewing loan applications, participants were asked to assess the applicant's credit
risk along 15 credit-scoring criteria adapted from the standard format of a leading Indian
bank. Internal ratings range from 0 to 100 (with a higher score indicating higher credit
quality) and were not binding for the loan ocer's lending decision. The risk ratings serve
three purposes. First, they add realism to the lab session, as completing a (non-binding)
risk rating is a routine part of evaluating applications. Second, they allow us to elicit a
measure of perceived credit risk that is not tied to loan ocer compensation. Finally, internal
ratings serve to assist the loan ocer in aggregating information about the application in a
systematic way. To ensure that internal ratings are an unbiased reection of a loan ocer's
true risk-assessment, participants were reminded that internal risk ratings were not tied to
monetary incentives and never reviewed by the administrating sta.
Loan ocers were asked to evaluate loans based on their best judgment, but were given
no information about the ratio of good and bad loans or the outcome of any particular loan
under evaluation.
B.4 Incentive Treatments
To test the impact of performance pay on loan ocer behavior, we exogenously vary
three features of the incentive scheme faced by the loan ocer: the incentive power of the
contract, the time horizon over which performance incentives are paid, and the degree of
limited liability enjoyed by a loan ocer. We vary the power of the incentive contract by
assigning loan ocers to contracts that specify three conditional payments: a payment wP
made when a loan is approved and performs, a payment wD, made when a loan is approved
and defaults and a payment w that is made when a loan is declined.
Because the outcome of a loan is only observed with some delay, performance incen-
tives, in practice, must be paid with a lag. In our setting, under the non-deferred payment
scheme, incentives were paid immediately following an experimental session. In the deferred
15compensation scheme, incentive payments were delayed by three months.
Finally, we experimentally relax loan ocers' limited liability constraint, by providing
an initial endowment that the participant can lose if she approves non-performing loans.
This mimics proposed \clawback" schemes. Throughout the paper, we express experimental
incentive contracts as as the vector w = [wP;wD;w]. In addition to these three performance-
based conditional payments, loan ocers received an unconditional show-up fee of Rs 100
(US$ 2.25) each time they participated in a session of the experiment.
In order to ensure that participants perceived these conditional payos as salient, we
calibrated the mean payout of experimental incentive schemes to approximately 1.5 times
the hourly wage of the median participant in our experiment, a public sector credit ocer
with ten years of professional experience, an annual income of Rs 240,000 (US$ 4,800) and
an approximate hourly wage of Rs 125 (US$ 2.5).
Because understanding the impact of performance pay on costly screening eort is a main
objective of the experiment, half of our sessions included a \costly information" feature. In
this treatment condition, loan ocers were given an initial information endowment of Rs
108. Under the costly information condition, loan ocers were able to review only basic
client and loan information items for free21 and were charged Rs 3 per section for as many of
the remaining loan le sections as they chose to view. In these sessions, loan ocers received
their remaining information endowment at the conclusion of the session, in addition to any
incentive payments. Table II summarizes the experimental incentive schemes.
[Place Table II about here]
We use the random assignment of incentive contacts to test the following predictions.
First, origination incentives will lead to greater risk-taking. Indeed, under this type of
incentive, purely rational and prot-maximizing loan ocers should indiscriminately approve
21Two out of nine sections of the loan application could be viewed for free. This included the basic
customer prole and the list of veried documentation provided.
16all applications, and exert no eort to screen out bad applications.22 Second, high-powered
incentives will increase eort by increasing the rewards for a protable lending decision and
increasing the penalty for originating a loan that ultimately becomes delinquent.23 Third,
high-powered incentives will induce more conservative lending behavior by increasing the
utility cost of making a bad lending decision. Fourth, if a loan ocer's discount rate is
greater than zero, the amount of eort induced by deferred compensation will be less than
the amount of eort induced by an immediate bonus.
Finally, if loan ocers are intrinsically motivated, or responsive to reputational consider-
ations or career concerns, they may invest in screening even when such eort will not yield
additional remuneration.24
IV. Empirical Strategy and Results
A. Specication
Since treatment status was randomly assigned, our empirical strategy is straightforward
and we estimate regressions of the form:
yil =
K 1 X
k=1
kTilk + i + l + 
0Ril + 
0Xil + "il (1)
where yil is the outcome of interest for loan ocer i and loan l, Til is a vector of treatment
dummies for the incentive schemes being compared to the baseline. In all regressions, we use
22It is of course possible that nancial incentives interact with loan ocers intrinsic motivation. If this
is the case, our experiments measure the combined eect of a \classical" increase in eort, along with any
changes in eort due to intrinsic motivation. This is the policy relevant parameter.
23Note that this implies that the eort exerted under these treatments can be ranked B > A > C.
24Theoretical work has also suggested that monetary incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation. How-
ever, a recurring theme in this literature is that some very restrictive conditions need to be fullled for
\incentive crowding" to occur. Benabou and Tirole [2003] for example note that incentive crowding requires
the employer (bank) to have an information advantage over the employee (loan ocer). We believe that this
is unlikely to be the case in the setting we study.
17the low-powered baseline incentive wB = [20;0;10] as the omitted category. We additionally
control for loan ocer xed eects, i, loan le xed eects l, and individual controls Xil,
including loan ocer age, seniority, rank, education, and dummies for whether the loan
ocer has management or business experience. Finally, the experiments took approximately
one year to complete, and not all incentive schemes were eligible to be assigned in any
given session. Hence, our regressions include a set of xed eects Ril to control for these
randomization strata. Standard errors are clustered at the loan ocer-session level, the same
level at which the treatment is assigned.
Our dataset includes 14,369 lending decisions, representing 206 unique subjects, with
three key treatment conditions: (1) Low-powered incentives, which we use as the baseline
throughout the empirical analysis; (2) High-powered incentives, which reward loan ocers
for approving loans that perform and penalizes the origination of loans that default; and (3)
Origination bonus, which rewards the loan ocer for every originated loan.25
In addition to these incentive vectors, we vary conditions under which incentives are paid.
In 369 randomly selected sessions (2,214 loan evaluations), we defer incentive payments by 3
months, rather than paying immediately. In further 163 sessions (978 evaluations), we relax
the participant's limited liability constraint by providing an initial information endowment
of Rs 200 (US$ 4.5), which can be lost if a loan ocer makes a series of unprotable lending
decisions. Finally, in 137 sessions (3,638 loans), we provide loan ocers with an initial
information endowment of Rs 108 (US$ 2.25), which they may spend to sections of the loan
le. Table II summarizes the sample sizes by treatment condition. Table D.I in the Internet
Appendix reports a test of random assignment.
To test our hypotheses, we consider three primary groups of outcome variables: (i) mea-
sures of screening eort, (ii) measures of subjective risk-assessment, and (iii) lending decisions
25Regressions using all data we collected, which includes the performance bonus schemes which pay only
if a loan performs, along with the appropriate treatment dummies, are reported in the Internet Appendix.
18(actual risk-taking) and the resulting protability of originated loans. We construct two mea-
sures of screening eort: the number of credit le sections reviewed by a credit ocer; and
the amount of money spent on reviewing additional information under the costly-information
treatment. To measure risk-assessment and risk-taking, we record internal risk ratings as-
signed to each loan. Finally, to evaluate loan ocer decisions and performance, we match the
loan ocer's lending decision to the actual protability of the loan to the nancial institution.
B. Descriptive Statistics { Loan Evaluations
Before turning to the main analysis, we report descriptive statistics of loan evaluations
during the exercise. We rst verify that the experimental task is meaningful, in the sense
that it is indeed possible for loan ocers to infer credit risk based on hard information
contained in an applicant's loan le. Table D.II in the Internet Appendix presents mean
comparisons of loan application information for performing and non-performing loans. There
are a number of dierences in hard information characteristics that help distinguish ex-post
performing from non-performing loans. In particular, borrowers who defaulted on their loans
had substantially lower revenue, younger businesses, higher ratios of monthly debt service
to income, compared to borrowers who remained current on their obligations. Overdues
on credit reports also predicted default. Higher-quality borrowers reported higher levels of
debt, consistent with the common observation of low-quality borrowers being excluded from
formal credit markets.
[Place Table III about here]
Table III reports summary statistics of loan evaluations by loan type and incentive.
We note the following. First, even for a group of highly experienced loan ocers, making
protable lending decisions in this lending environment was not a trivial task, as indicated by
the signicant heterogeneity of performance across loan ocers documented in Figure 1. On
19average, loan ocers approved 75% of all loans evaluated in the experiment and made correct
lending decisions in 64% of all cases. Lending volume responds dramatically to incentives.
Lending decisions were, however, protable under all incentive schemes in the experiment
and would have earned the bank an average net present value of US$ 710 (11% of the
median loan size) per originated loan. Identifying performing loans was substantially easier
than identifying non-performing loans or loans that were rejected by the Lender ex-ante.
Changes in the incentive power of the contract were especially eective in improving loan
ocer's success in detecting non-performing loans, and these patterns are directly reected
in the protability of loans approved under alternative incentives.
[Place Figure 1 about here]
Table III, column [1] describes the number of sections a loan ocer reviewed prior to
making a decision, while Table III, column [2] gives this number for only the subsample
which was charged to see additional sections from the loan le. Virtually all loan ocers
study the basic information and borrower prole sections. However, some chose to reject or
accept a loan without viewing the entire application, particularly when the incentive scheme
did not reward higher-quality screening.26
In addition to observed lending decisions, we analyze loan ocer risk assessment, as
measured by the rating each loan ocer gave to each loan. Since ratings themselves were
not incentivized, one might wonder whether these ratings contain useful information. Fig-
ure 3 plots the distribution of loan ocers' risk ratings for performing and non-performing
loans and conrms that non-performing loans indeed received signicantly lower ratings. A
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects equality of the rating distributions at the 1% level.
Table D.IV in the Internet Appendix reports additional tests, in which we use internal
26When information was costly, loan ocers were most likely to review sections of the loan le that
contained basic nancial information, such as income statements and balance sheet information, and much
less likely to pay for additional sections of the le such as site visit reports (results not reported in table).
20ratings to predict loan approvals and performance. The results show that loan ocer as-
sessments of credit risk are a meaningful and strongly signicant predictor of actual lending
decisions, the probability of default and the protability of loans. This is true for the overall
rating as well as its sub-components measuring personal and nancial risk.
[Place Figure 2 about here]
Since loan ocers complete multiple sessions, one might wonder whether loan ocers
learn over the course of the study. An armative answer might be cause for concern, given
that our average loan ocer has more than ten years of experience in lending. To verify
that learning over the course of the exercise poses no threat to the validity of our results,
Figure 2 plots the average fraction of correct decisions and average prot per originated loan
as a function of the number of completed sessions. These demonstrate no learning eect, a
result which is conrmed by a parametric test for learning during the experiment, reported
in Table D.III in the Internet Appendix.
[Place Figure 3 about here]
C. Results
C.1 Incentivizing Screening Eort
We rst analyze the eect of incentives on screening eort. Intuitively, performance
incentives can aect the quality of lending decisions if they induce a loan ocer to choose
higher screening eort, translating into a more thorough evaluation of available information.
The design of our experiment provides us with a straightforward measure of screening eort.
Specically, we record how many of the ten sections of the credit le the loan ocer chooses
to review before making a decision. In a separate set of sub-treatments meant to make the
eort trade-o even more stark, we charge loan ocers Rs 3 for each section of the loan dossier
21beyond what would be available on the application form.27 As human subject considerations
precluded an experimental design in which loan ocers would pay to participate, we provide
each loan ocer with an initial information endowment of Rs 108 (approximately US$ 2.25
per experimental session). Participants could choose not to pay for additional tabs, in which
case Rs 108 would be paid to them at the end of the session, in addition to whatever show-up
and incentive payments they earn. This information cost was not trivial: purchasing access
to all six tabs would cost close to the maximum payout of Rs 20 under the low-powered and
origination incentives. We use the amount spent to view loan sections as a second measure
of screening eort, capturing the notion of costly information. Because screening eort is
not observable to the bank, we do not tie bonus payments to measures of observed eort.
Table IV reports the eect of performance pay on screening eort, measured by the num-
ber of loan le sections reviewed when the only cost of eort was the loan ocer's time
(columns [1] and [2]), as well as when the loan ocer was required to pay to view addi-
tional tabs (columns [3] and [4]). High-powered incentives signicantly increase screening
eort. On average, loan ocers facing high-powered incentives viewed .4 additional infor-
mation tabs when there was no charge to view additional sections (the mean number of tabs
viewed was 5.06 when information was free, and 3.99 when information was costly). When
information was costly, high-powered incentives had an even stronger eect, increasing the
average number of tabs viewed by .8-1.2. These eects are statistically signicant across
all specications. Interestingly, we do not observe eort to be signicantly lower when loan
ocers face origination bonuses, although the standard errors are not small enough to rule
out meaningful eects. These results conrm that loan ocers respond strongly to monetary
incentives, and suggest that performance pay can incentivize eort in the review of borrower
information.
27Available for free were basic applicant details and list of provided documentation. Loan ocers paid to
view income statement, balance sheet, site visit reports, and trade and credit reference checks.
22[Place Table IV about here]
C.2 Risk-Assessment and Risk-Taking
How do performance incentives aect the perception of credit risk and actual risk-taking?
We measure loan ocers' subjective risk assessment of credit risk using the non-binding
internal risk-ratings that participants were asked to complete while evaluating loans.
In Table V we use these internal ratings to explore the eect of incentives on the percep-
tion of credit risk. We nd evidence that the structure of performance incentives distorts
the subjective assessment of credit risk. Loan ocers facing incentives that reward loan
origination inate internal ratings by as much as .16 standard deviations.
[Place Table V about here]
There are two interpretations that are consistent with this nding. Consider a model in
which loan ocers screen to detect negative signals about a potential borrower. A reduction
in eort would result in fewer negative signals, and higher loan ratings. An alternative
possibility, which we cannot rule out, is that loan ocers may fear harm to their reputation
if they approve a loan they have rated poorly, and therefore inate ratings of loans they
are going to approve. Finally, our ndings are also consistent with a behavioral view of
risk-assessment, which is outside the scope of our model. Loan ocers may change their
perception of credit risk if they are not comfortable thinking that the loans they wish to
approve under prevailing incentives are indeed of poor quality. This \wishful thinking"
eect has been discussed extensively in connection with subprime lending in the United
States (see e.g. Barberis [2012]) and documented in lab experiments (Mayraz [2012]). While
our experiment does not allow us to disentangle the degree to which each of these forces
is at work, an important implication of our results is that irrespective of the underlying
mechanism, the same set of clients is judged as collectively less risky when the bank oers
23an incentive scheme that places greater emphasis on lending volume.
We next turn to the eect of performance pay on risk-taking. Because the realized
outcome of a loan may be a poor proxy of the ex-ante riskiness at the time a loan is originated,
we take advantage of the fact that we had more than 100 loan ocers rate each loan, and
construct two measure of ex-ante risk based on loan level ratings under the baseline incentive.
The rst measure of risk is simply the loan's average rating under the low-powered baseline
incentive. The second risk measure is the coecient of variation, which measures the degree
of disagreement and uncertainty among loan ocers about the riskiness of the loan.
If high-powered incentives encourage more discerning lending decisions, we would expect
loan ocers to approve loans with higher average ratings and lower variance. Indeed, in
our data set, the coecient of variation is strongly correlated with default. Table VI tests
this hypothesis. In the regressions in Table VI, we restrict the sample to loans which a loan
ocer approved; thus the coecients give the average risk rating of loans approved under
a particular incentive scheme. We nd that high-powered incentives lead to slightly more
conservative lending intemrs of a loan's average risk-rating, though this result is marginally
signicant only for the measure of business and nancial risk (Table VI, columns [5] and
[6]). However, we nd strong evidence that high-powered incentives cause loan ocers to
shy away from loans that are risky in the sense that there is greater ex-ante uncertainty
about the interpretation of information contained in the loan le, as reected in greater
variance of a loan's baseline risk rating. Loans approved under high-powered incentives are
characterized by a signicantly lower coecient of variation of their baseline rating (Table
VI, columns [7] to [12]).
[Place Table VI about here]
24C.3 Lending Decisions and Loan-Level Prot
In Table VII, we turn to the impact of performance pay on lending decisions and loan
level prot. We nd that loan ocers facing compensation schemes that do not penalize
default are dramatically more likely to originate loans (Table VII, columns [1] and [2]).
Compared to the baseline condition, high-powered incentives lead to only slightly more
conservative lending decisions, with the share of loans approved dropping by between 3.6 and
.04%. This is a small eect relative to the mean acceptance rate of 71% under the baseline.
Incentive schemes that reward origination, on the other hand, result in a dramatic increase in
the probability of approval. Under the origination bonus treatment, loan approvals increase
by approximately 8 percentage points, statistically signicant at the 1% level. Both results
are consistent with evidence from non-experimental studies of loan ocer incentives (see, for
example, Agarwal and Ben-David [2012]).
[Place Table VII about here]
Of course, incentivizing more or less lending is relatively easy; the more interesting ques-
tion is whether incentives can make loan ocers more discerning. Table VII, columns [3] and
[4] show that laxer incentives increase the fraction of good loan clients who are approved,
roughly in proportion to the overall eect on lending. We nd a dramatically dierent pat-
tern for non-performing loans: loan ocers facing the high-powered incentive scheme are 11
percentage points less likely to approve these bad loans, a result that is signicant at the
5% level in column [5], despite the smaller sample size. In contrast, we nd large increases
in the fraction of non-performing loans approved under an incentive scheme that does not
penalize poor screening decisions. The pattern is similar for the sample of loans rejected by
the bank, though the statistical signicance of the high-powered incentive eect is lost.
In Table VII, columns [9] to [12], we study the eect of performance pay on the protabil-
ity of bank lending. Our rst measure is the net present value of repayments to the lender,
25less the amount disbursed, restricting the sample to loans approved by our experimental sub-
jects.28 This measure is relevant for a capital-constrained lending institution that seeks to
maximize average protability per loan made. columns [9] and [10] show that high-powered
incentives dramatically improve the protability of lending, raising prot per loan by US$
149 to US$ 176 per loan, which correponds to approximately 3% of the median loan size.
The nal two columns of Table VII consider prot per screened loan, setting the NPV of a
loan that is rejected by an experimental subject to zero. This measure makes most sense for
a lender whose lending opportunities may be limited and may face diculties sourcing addi-
tional clients. Again, we nd that high-powered incentives improve protability by roughly
similar magnitudes, though the result is only statistically signicant in the specication with
loan ocer xed-eects.
In our setting, the net interest margin is quite high (around 30%), so one might be con-
cerned that high-powered incentives lead loan ocers to behave too conservatively, declining
protable loans. In fact, we observe that high-powered incentives improve the quality of orig-
ination, and are therefore likely a protable proposition from the bank's perspective, even
when screening costs, reduced volume, and the cost of the incentive payments themselves
are taken into consideration.
C.4 Deferred Compensation
Eorts to regulate the compensation of loan originators have often focused on the alleged
\short-termism" present in many performance contracts in banking, and have therefore aimed
at extending the time-horizon of incentive payments. If loan ocers have higher discount
rates than shareholders, however, deferred compensation will blunt the eect of incentives.29
28Because we do not observe the outcome of loans that were originally rejected by the lender, we do not
include these loans in our prot calculations.
29One need not assume loan ocers are impatient: credit-constraints or concern about separation from
employers could also cause loan ocers to discount future payments at high rates.
26In this subsection, we test how the eects of incentive payments vary when the time
horizon of payouts is changed. It is worth noting that any compensation that varies with
loan repayment must be paid with some delay, as it takes time to observe whether loans
perform or not. The intent of our experimental treatments is to vary the extent of this
delay in performance-based compensation. We are primarily interested in understanding
whether deferred compensation weakens incentives for costly screening eort. We therefore
restrict attention to the subset of \costly information" treatments, in which loan ocers
pay to access additional sections of the loan application. We operationalize the concept
of deferred compensation by comparing loan ocer behavior under immediate performance
pay (for low-powered, high-powered and origination incentives) to behavior under a series of
treatments, in which incentive payments were awarded after a period of 90 days.30
Table VIII presents the results of the deferred compensation intervention. In Panel A, we
report the eect of deferred compensation on screening eort. Panel B reports on the eect
of deferred compensation on risk-taking, and treatment eects of deferred compensation
on loan-level prots are reported in Panel C. Note that in contrast to the previous tables,
the omitted category and relevant basis for comparison here is the low-powered treatment
with costly information. At the foot of the table, we report t-tests comparing the eect of
immediate versus deferred compensation. Consistent with basic theoretical predictions, the
results show that deferred compensation signicantly weakens the impact of high-powered
incentives (Table VIII, columns [3] and [4]). This is most apparent in the eect of deferred
incentives on screening eort, as measured by loan sections purchased. In column [3], the
dierence between immediate high-powered incentive payments and the exact same payments
deferred 90 days is large, [1.225 - (-.454)], and signicant at the 1% level. While high-powered
30Note that our estimates do not dierentiate between the pure eect of deferring incentive payments and
the lower real value of the payment at a future date. The setup of our treatments assumes that the relevant
comparison in a real world compensation contracts is between the nominal value of payment today versus
the same payment at a future date.
27incentives induce loan ocers to lend more conservatively (columns [5] and [6]), deferring
those same payments attenuates this eect. High-powered incentives lead loan ocers to
shy away from loans that appear riskier ex-ante, irrespective of whether the high-powered
incentives are deferred (columns [7] and [8]). The point estimates of protability are lower
for deferred weak (baseline) incentives, as well as the high-powered incentives, though the
dierence is signicant at the 10% level only for weak incentives. Finally, the results provide
some suggestive evidence that deferred compensation may mitigate some of the negative
implications of volume incentives. Although loan approvals are similarly high under deferred
and non-deferred origination incentives, loans approved under deferred origination incentives
are more protable than loans approved under non-deferred volume incentives (Table VIII,
column [9]).
[Place Table VIII about here]
C.5 Relaxing Limited Liability
In the same way that banks beneting from deposit insurance and other implicit guar-
antees may be tempted to take high-risk low-NPV gambles, loan ocers seeking to maximize
their variable compensation may be tempted to take excessive risks due to the fact that they
are protected by limited liability. To test how the presence of limited liability, an inher-
ent characteristic of incentive contracts for loan originators, aects loan ocer behavior,
we randomly assigned loan ocers to a treatment that relaxed the ocer's limited liabity
constraint. In this treatment, participants received an endowment of Rs 200 (US$ 4.5) at
the beginning of each session, which was theirs to take home unless their incentive payments
for the session were negative. The worst outcome for a loan ocer would be to approve two
bad loans and decline four good loans under high-powered incentives, in which case incentive
payments would be Rs -200 and the loan ocer's payout would be zero. The endowment
28therefore completely relaxed the limited liability constraint for the session.
Table IX presents the results. We nd evidence to suggest that relaxing limited liability
indeed increases loan ocers' screening eort (columns [3] and [4]), though the dierences
are not statistically signicant. Surprisingly, loan ocers approve loans that appear to be
on average lower quality (column [5]) when limited liability is relaxed. When taking lending
decisions, loan ocers are more conservative without limited liability, though the size of this
dierence is modest (the dierence in coecients in column [7] is 2.9 percentage points) and
not statistically signicant. Taken at face value, these results suggest that ensuring loan
ocers have more skin in the game has only modest eects on eort and the protability of
lending decisions. Note, however that in a loan ocer's real work environment \unlimited'
liability" may include career considerations and the possibility of losing one's job. In our
experiment, we only partly capture these non-pecuniary factors, so that our results should
be interpreted as lower bound estimates.
[Place Table IX about here]
D. Do Loan Ocer Characteristics Matter?
The analysis so far documents that the structure of performance pay has important
eects on loan ocer behavior. However, individual ability and personality traits may play
an important role in determining how loan ocers respond to incentives.
In this subsection, we use loan ocer characteristics to explore the mechanisms by which
incentives aect behavior, and to compare their relative importance. We proceed in three
steps. First, we benchmark the eect of performance pay against the heterogeneity in per-
formance we observe absent such variation in monetary incentives. Second, we test whether
reputational motivations and career concerns can explain heterogeneity in eort, and doc-
ument the size of the eect. Finally, we examine whether nancial incentives interact with
29loan ocer personality traits to determine screening behavior: are greater nancial rewards,
for example, less eective in eliciting eort from risk-averse individuals?
We are able to answer these questions because our data collection eorts included a de-
tailed elicitation of loan ocer characteristics and personality traits, including two widely
used personality tests: the `Big Five' (BFI) personality test (John, Donahue and Kentle
[1991]) and the `LOT-R' life orientation test (Scheier, Carver and Bridges [1994]). While
these tests are widely used, and a small literature has established that individual heterogene-
ity aects management decisions,31 there is little work that systematically links employee
personality traits to nancial decisions. We are aware of only one study in the nance litera-
ture, Graham, Harvey and Puri [2013], which uses psychometric tests to link the personality
traits of senior executives to rms' nancial decisions.
We complement this work in several ways. We show that personality traits are an im-
portant determinant of employee behavior, and explain variation in eort, even in a setting
without explicit nancial incentives. Second, an important nding in Graham, Harvey and
Puri [2013] is that growth rms employ less risk-averse executives, suggesting endogenous
matching between rm and employee. This, however, leaves open the question whether em-
poyees with dierent personality traits vary in their response to incentives. We are able
to address this question using exogenous variation in incentive contracts induced by our
experiment.
The most direct test for individual heterogeneity is a joint test of signicance of the loan
ocer xed eects from equation (1). We reject the hypothesis that loan ocer heterogene-
ity does not aect screening eort at the 1% level (F-Statistic 71.98, with N=204 degrees
of freedom). The magnitude of loan ocer eects is economically signicant, with ocers
at the 75th percentile of the eort distribution viewing approximately 45% more tabs than
ocers at the 25th percentile of the distribution. This signicant heterogeneity in loan ocer
31See Bertrand and Schoar [2003], Malmendier and Tate [2005] and Landier and Thesmar [2009].
30eort suggests that the decision to exert screening eort depends on more than compensation
policy alone: even in settings without explicit monetary incentives, reputational concerns
and the prospect of promotion may motivate employees. Based on this observation, our next
test examines whether reputational concerns drive screening behavior, by examining whether
individuals whose characteristics indicate stronger reputational concerns behave dierently.
To do this, we estimate regressions of the form:
yil =
K 1 X
k=1
kT +
L X
l=1
lz +
K 1 X
k=1
L X
l=1
kl(T  z) + i + l + 
0Ril + 
0Xil + "il (2)
where z is a personality trait, Xil is a control vector, which includes loan ocer age, rank,
gender, education, business experience, dummy variables for branch manager experience and
employment at a private sector bank, Ril is a matrix of treatment conditions and all other
variables are as previously dened. We consider both the main eect of each personality
trait, as well as its interaction with the exogenously assigned monetary incentives. The
results are presented in Table X. dependent variable is always eort, which is measured by
the number of sections of the loan le that the loan ocer reviews. Columns [1] to [4] include
all observations, while columns [5] to [8] are restricted to the sample of observations in which
loan oers faced an explicit monetary cost for viewing additional sections of the loan le.
[Place Table X about here]
In Table X, Panel A, we rst consider the possibility that loan ocer behavior is driven
by career concerns {a special type of reputational motivation, which would imply that eort
is a decreasing function of age. Consistent with the career concerns hypothesis we nd that,
ceteris paribus, older loan ocers exert less eort. Taking the point estimate from column
[5], a loan ocer close to retirement (aged 60) will review .36 fewer loan le sections than a
30-year old ocer. This represents a 10% reduction in eort. The presence of career concerns
31can also explain why loan ocers are motivated to exert eort and make appropriate lending
decisions even in the absence of explicit nancial incentives.
The second entry of Table X, Panel A examines whether loan ocers from private sector
banks behave dierently than those employed by public sector banks. Private banks are likely
to be more meritocratic and oer faster promotion paths so that the returns to demonstrating
one's type may be higher. Similarly, private banks may attract employees who are more
responsive to implicit career incentives. Both mechanisms would suggest stronger career
concerns, and imply that private bankers exert greater baseline eort when compared to
their public sector counterparts. We nd that this is indeed the case: private sector loan
ocers exert greater baseline screening eort under any monetary incentive scheme.
In TableX, Panel B, we data from psychometric tests and loan ocer surveys to exam-
ine how loan ocer behavior varies with xed personality traits. We nd that personality
matters: individuals who are risk-averse, altruistic, or state that they wish to live up to
personal and professional expectations exert signicantly higher eort under any monetary
incentive. By contrast, loan ocers who are overcondent32 screen signicantly less. Per-
sonality also aects risk-ratings and the ability to correctly identify good loans. Optimistic
loan ocers rate loans signicantly higher. Risk-averse loan ocers are signicantly more
likely to approve non-performing loans while the opposite is true for impatient loan ocers:
a loan ocer in the top decile of the discount rate distribution is 16% more likely to originate
a non-performing loan than the average loan ocer.33
Finally, to shed light on the mechanism through which performance-based compensation
aects loan ocer behavior, we test whether monetary rewards aect eort and performance
directly, or through their interaction with xed personality traits. Standard agency theory
would, for example, predict that it is more expensive to induce eort when agents are risk-
32We classify a loan ocer as overcondent if she incorrectly ranks herself in the top decile of the perfor-
mance distribution.
33The complete set of heterogeneous eects results are available in the Internet Appendix.
32averse. The opposite may be true for traits such as optimism or overcondence, which
might accentuate the response to high-powered incentives. The answer to this question
has important implications for nancial rms: if the eects of incentives vary by employee
type, then rms must not only seek out employees with desirable personality traits, but also
consider which type of incentive contract is the best match for their employee population.
By and large, we nd only weak evidence that the eects of incentives vary by personal
characteristics. In Table X, column [3] of Panel B.4, we nd that more conscientious indi-
viduals alter their behavior less in response to changes in incentives, though this pattern is
not consistent across measures of eort (Table X, column [7] of Panel B.4). In total, ve of
the twenty possible interactions in Table X, Panel B are statistically signicant at the 5%
level. This is more than would be expected by chance, but does not provide overwhelming
evidence that incentives are mediated by personality type.
More condent, optimistic, or conscientious loan ocers do not respond more strongly to
performance-based compensation than their peers. An interesting exception, consistent with
the reputational motivations documented above, is that private sector bankers respond to
incentives dierently. In particular, we nd an asymmetric response when ocers are moved
from the baseline, low-incentive treatment. When given higher-powered incentives, private
sector ocers do not increase eort, but when oered the origination bonus scheme, they
dramatically reduce eort.
In summary, our analysis suggests that career concerns are an important mechanism
which generates eort above and beyond what would be expected from immediate nancial
incentives alone. A second lesson from this section is that personal characteristics are an
important determinant of loan ocer behavior that may constrain the ability of performance
pay to aect screening eort. However, we do not nd systematic evidence that incentives
work dierentially for ocers with dierent personal characteristics.
33V. Conclusion
Understanding how performance compensation aects risk-taking is a question of rst
order importance in nance. However, identifying the individual response to incentives is
dicult, as we rarely observe decisions under exogenously dierent incentive environments.
In this paper, we use an experiment with experienced loan ocers to identify the eect of
performance-based compensation on risk-assessment and risk-taking. We nd a strong and
economically signicant eect of performance pay on risk-assessment and lending behavior.
Incentives that reward lending volume lead to high acceptance rates, low eort and high
default. By contrast, high-powered incentives are eective at generating eort, leading loan
ocers to correctly identify and screen out bad loans, and raising the overall protability
of lending. Giving loan ocers \equity" in a loan that they can lose also leads to greater
eort, but does not appreciably improve the protability of lending, as loan ocers become
signicantly more conservative and originate fewer loans.
At the same time, we document several factors that constrain the ability of conventional
incentive contracts to alter loan ocer behavior. First, deferred compensation {a standard
feature of loan ocer compensation contracts, due to the fact that loan outcomes are only
observed with some delay{ severely attenuates the power of monetary incentives. In our
sample of professional loan ocers, delaying bonus payments by just three months dramat-
ically reduces eort, and the protability of lending. This important limitation may help
explain why we do not see front-line lending ocers facing compensation which varies closely
with the performance of their loan portfolios. Interestingly, however, we nd that deferred
incentives also limit the temptation to originate poor quality loans under permissive incen-
tive schemes. This suggests that extending the time horizon of loan ocer compensation
can encourage more prudent lending decisions in settings where volume incentives are the
norm and where it may be dicult to implement pay-for-performance.
34Second, using psychometric tests, we show that personality traits and demographic char-
acteristics have a strong eect on screening eort that is unrelated to monetary incentives.
Irrespective of monetary incentives, eort declines with age, which is consistent with the pres-
ence of career concerns. Our results suggest that performance pay aects behavior directly,
rather than by accentuating traits such as risk-aversion, conscientiousness or overcondence.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the eect of a loan ocer's personality type
is quantitatively important: under our baseline incentive scenario, where monetary incentives
are weak, a loan ocer at the 75th percentile of the eort distribution reviewed 45% more
loan le sections than an ocer at the 25th percentile of the distribution. This eect size is
large, in fact much larger than the increase in eort observed when loan ocers transition
from baseline to high-powered incentives, which leads to a 23% increase in the number of
loan le sections reviewed. This variation helps explain why we observe screening eort even
when loan ocers face no nancial incentives. It also suggests that even in settings where
monetary incentives \work", their ecacy may be bounded by xed personality traits.
Finally, we provide evidence that monetary incentives distort the perception of credt risk:
permissive incentives lead loan ocers to rate loans as signicantly less risky than the same
loans evaluated under pay-for-performance.
These ndings have important implications for the design of performance-based com-
pensation in lending. Lenders have increasingly relied on credit scoring models rather than
human judgment. But it is unclear whether credit scoring can outperform human judgment,
particularly in informationally opaque credit markets, such as the one we study. Nor is it
obvious what individual characteristics are associated with screening ability and to what
extent they help or hinder the use of performance incentives as a tool to manage credit-risk.
The results in this paper are a rst step towards answering these important questions.
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39Tables and Figures
Table I
Loan Ocer Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for loan ocer demographics and personality traits. Panel A, columns
[1] to [4] report demographic characteristics for all participants of the experiment. Panel A, columns [5]
to [8] report summary statistics for the same demographic characteristics for the loan ocer population
of a large public sector bank as a basis for comparison. Male is a dummy variable equal to one if the
participant is male. Age is the loan ocer's age. Experience is the number of years the loan ocer has been
employed with the bank. Seniority is the loan ocer's seniority rank, ranging from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest).
Education is a dummy equal to one if a loan ocer has a master's degree or equivalent qualication. Private
sector banker is a dummy equal to one if a loan ocer is employed by a private sector bank. Panel B reports
summary statistics for the tests of attitudes and personality characteristics completed by participants of
the experiment. Impatience is a dummy equal to one if a loan ocer's monthly discount rate is in the top
decile of the sample distribution. Risk averse is a dummy equal to one if a participant states that she never
plays the lottery. Optimism is the LOT-R test measure of optimism (Scheier, Carver and Bridges [1994]).
Conscientiousness is the `Big Five' (BFI) personality test measure of conscientiousness (John, Donahue and
Kentle [1991]). Condence is a dummy equal to one if a loan ocer ranks herself in the top decile of the
performance distribution. Overcondence is a dummy equal to one if a loan ocer incorrectly ranks herself
in the top decile of the performance distribution, based on the realized outcome of all lending decisions
made in the experiment.
Panel A: Demographics
Experiment participants [N=209] Bank sample [N=3,111]
N Mean Median StdDev N Mean Median StdDev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male 206 0.90 1.00 0.30 3,111 0.9 1.00 0.30
Age 206 37.60 35.00 10.94 3,111 37.9 35.00 12.0
Experience [Years] 206 12.76 10.00 11.30 3,111 13.90 11.00 13.00
Seniority [1 (Lowest) - 5 (Highest)] 206 1.94 2.00 1.00 3,111 1.60 2.00 0.75
Education [Master's degree] 200 0.33 0.00 0.47 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Private sector banker 206 0.26 0.00 0.43 3,111 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Personality traits
Experiment participants
N Mean Median StdDev p10 p25 p75 p90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Impatient 74 0.11 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Risk averse 172 0.75 1.00 0.43 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00
Optimism [LOT-R] 64 2.37 2.33 0.46 1.83 2.17 2.67 3.00
Conscientiousness [BFI] 72 3.81 3.89 0.47 3.11 3.50 4.17 4.44
Condence 71 0.73 0.78 0.20 0.50 0.60 0.85 0.99
Overcondence 69 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
40T
a
b
l
e
I
I
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
o
f
I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
T
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
s
T
h
i
s
t
a
b
l
e
s
u
m
m
a
r
i
z
e
s
t
h
e
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
a
l
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
s
.
E
a
c
h
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
s
o
f
a
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
w
P
f
o
r
a
p
p
r
o
v
i
n
g
a
l
o
a
n
t
h
a
t
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
s
,
a
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
w
D
f
o
r
a
p
p
r
o
v
i
n
g
a
l
o
a
n
t
h
a
t
d
e
f
a
u
l
t
s
a
n
d
a
n
o
u
t
s
i
d
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
w
f
o
r
d
e
c
l
i
n
i
n
g
a
l
o
a
n
,
i
n
w
h
i
c
h
c
a
s
e
t
h
e
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
l
o
a
n
i
s
n
o
t
o
b
s
e
r
v
e
d
.
A
l
l
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
r
e
f
e
r
t
o
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
p
a
y
o

s
f
o
r
a
n
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
.
T
h
e
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
[
w
P
,
w
D
,
w
]
f
o
r
e
a
c
h
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
a
r
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
[
1
]
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
[
2
]
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
b
y
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
c
h
e
m
e
,
a
n
d
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
[
3
]
t
o
[
8
]
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
i
z
e
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
s
u
b
s
e
t
o
f
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
`
c
o
s
t
l
y
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
'
,
`
d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
i
o
n
'
a
n
d
`
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
'
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
s
.
U
n
d
e
r
t
h
e
`
c
o
s
t
l
y
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
'
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
,
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
a
r
e
c
h
a
r
g
e
d
c
r
e
d
i
t
s
t
o
r
e
v
i
e
w
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
t
h
e
l
o
a
n

l
e
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
.
F
o
r
l
o
a
n
s
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
e
d
u
n
d
e
r
t
h
e
`
d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
i
o
n
'
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
,
l
o
a
n
o

c
e
r
s
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
a
l
l
e
a
r
n
e
d
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
w
i
t
h
a
t
h
r
e
e
m
o
n
t
h
l
a
g
,
u
n
d
e
r
t
h
e
`
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
'
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
,
l
o
a
n
o

c
e
r
s
a
r
e
g
i
v
e
n
a
n
e
n
d
o
w
m
e
n
t
,
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
y
c
a
n
l
o
s
e
b
y
m
a
k
i
n
g
b
a
d
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
.
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
C
o
s
t
l
y
D
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
L
i
m
i
t
e
d
T
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
[
a
m
o
u
n
t
i
n
R
s
]
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
C
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
i
o
n
L
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
[
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
j
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
j
D
e
c
l
i
n
e
]
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
A
L
o
w
-
P
o
w
e
r
e
d
[
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
]
[
2
0
,
0
,
1
0
]
7
,
4
2
0
3
,
7
8
2
3
,
6
3
8
6
,
5
6
8
8
5
2
N
/
A
7
,
4
2
0
B
H
i
g
h
-
P
o
w
e
r
e
d
[
5
0
,
-
1
0
0
,
0
]
2
,
9
4
6
6
5
4
2
,
2
9
2
2
,
4
9
6
4
5
0
9
7
8
1
,
9
6
8
C
O
r
i
g
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
B
o
n
u
s
[
2
0
,
2
0
,
0
]
2
,
5
4
8
7
6
2
1
,
7
8
6
1
,
6
3
2
9
1
6
N
/
A
2
,
5
4
8
41T
a
b
l
e
I
I
I
L
o
a
n
E
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
T
h
i
s
t
a
b
l
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
s
u
m
m
a
r
y
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
m
a
d
e
i
n
t
h
e
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
b
y
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
.
T
h
e
t
a
b
l
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
u
n
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
m
e
a
n
s
a
n
d
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
l
o
a
n
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
m
a
d
e
u
n
d
e
r
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
,
h
i
g
h
-
p
o
w
e
r
e
d
a
n
d
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
.
L
e
n
d
i
n
g
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
m
a
d
e
u
n
d
e
r
t
h
e
`
d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
'
a
n
d
`
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
l
i
a
b
i
l
t
y
'
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
c
o
n
d
i
t
o
n
s
a
r
e
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
.
T
h
e

r
s
t
t
w
o
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
o
f
t
h
e
t
a
b
l
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
u
m
m
a
r
y
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
f
o
r
s
c
r
e
e
n
i
n
g
e

o
r
t
,
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
r
e
v
i
e
w
e
d
i
s
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
l
o
a
n

l
e
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
r
e
v
i
e
w
e
d
.
A
m
o
u
n
t
s
p
e
n
t
o
n
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
c
r
e
d
i
t
s
s
p
e
n
t
b
y
l
o
a
n
o

c
e
r
s
f
o
r
l
o
a
n
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
m
a
d
e
u
n
d
e
r
t
h
e
`
c
o
s
t
l
y
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
'
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
w
h
i
c
h
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
w
e
r
e
c
h
a
r
g
e
d
t
o
a
c
c
e
s
s
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
b
e
y
o
n
d
t
h
e
b
a
s
i
c
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
n
t
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
.
R
i
s
k
r
a
t
i
n
g
i
s
t
h
e
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
r
i
s
k
-
r
a
t
i
n
g
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
t
o
l
o
a
n
s
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
e
d
u
n
d
e
r
a
g
i
v
e
n
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
,
w
i
t
h
h
i
g
h
e
r
r
a
t
i
n
g
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
n
g
b
e
t
t
e
r
l
o
a
n
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
.
A
p
p
r
o
v
e
d
i
s
t
h
e
s
h
a
r
e
o
f
l
o
a
n
s
a
p
p
r
o
v
e
d
.
P
r
o

t
i
s
t
h
e
p
r
o

t
p
e
r
s
c
r
e
e
n
e
d
l
o
a
n
.
I
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
[
7
]
t
o
[
1
0
]
,
w
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
t
h
e
s
h
a
r
e
o
f
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
b
y
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
f
o
r
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
a
s
a
w
h
o
l
e
,
a
n
d
t
h
e
s
u
b
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
o
f
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
,
n
o
n
-
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
a
n
d
e
x
-
a
n
t
e
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
d
l
o
a
n
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
A
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
i
s
d
e

n
e
d
a
s
a
p
p
r
o
v
i
n
g
a
l
o
a
n
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
e
x
-
p
o
s
t
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
e
d
,
o
r
t
u
r
n
i
n
g
d
o
w
n
a
l
o
a
n
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
w
a
s
e
i
t
h
e
r
s
c
r
e
e
n
d
o
u
t
b
y
t
h
e
l
e
n
d
e
r
o
r
d
e
f
a
u
l
t
e
d
.
E

o
r
t
R
i
s
k
r
a
t
i
n
g
A
p
p
r
o
v
e
d
P
r
o

t
p
e
r
l
o
a
n
E
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
C
o
r
r
e
c
t
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
A
m
o
u
n
t
s
p
e
n
t
%
s
c
r
e
e
n
e
d
a
p
p
r
o
v
e
d
S
a
m
p
l
e
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
N
o
n
-
D
e
c
l
i
n
e
d
r
e
v
i
e
w
e
d
o
n
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
i
n
g
b
y
b
a
n
k
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
(
1
0
)
S
a
m
p
l
e
5
.
0
7
2
.
3
1
7
1
.
6
9
0
.
7
4
5
4
2
.
9
1
6
9
9
.
0
2
0
.
6
4
0
.
8
0
0
.
2
8
0
.
4
6
(
2
.
3
6
)
(
3
.
7
6
)
(
1
5
.
7
7
)
(
0
.
4
4
)
(
1
8
7
0
.
0
8
)
(
2
0
9
6
.
1
4
)
(
0
.
4
8
)
(
0
.
4
0
)
(
0
.
4
5
)
(
0
.
5
0
)
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
5
.
2
5
2
.
0
1
7
0
.
8
2
0
.
7
2
5
2
9
.
9
8
6
9
3
.
0
4
0
.
6
4
0
.
7
8
0
.
2
8
0
.
5
1
(
2
.
4
1
)
(
3
.
5
7
)
(
1
5
.
7
0
)
(
0
.
4
5
)
(
1
8
6
4
.
0
7
)
(
2
1
0
4
.
9
9
)
(
0
.
4
8
)
(
0
.
4
1
)
(
0
.
4
5
)
(
0
.
5
0
)
H
i
g
h
-
p
o
w
e
r
e
d
5
.
0
1
3
.
1
9
7
4
.
0
0
0
.
6
9
5
7
6
.
1
0
8
0
1
.
4
5
0
.
6
4
0
.
7
5
0
.
3
9
0
.
4
8
(
2
.
3
3
)
(
4
.
4
2
)
(
1
5
.
6
7
)
(
0
.
4
6
)
(
1
7
3
2
.
7
0
)
(
1
9
9
9
.
2
2
)
(
0
.
4
8
)
(
0
.
4
3
)
(
0
.
4
9
)
(
0
.
5
0
)
O
r
i
g
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
4
.
5
9
2
.
5
2
7
2
.
4
5
0
.
8
4
5
5
4
.
8
3
6
4
8
.
3
7
0
.
6
5
0
.
8
7
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
9
(
2
.
1
8
)
(
3
.
6
1
)
(
1
5
.
8
3
)
(
0
.
3
7
)
(
1
9
8
6
.
0
7
)
(
2
1
3
2
.
8
8
)
(
0
.
4
8
)
(
0
.
3
3
)
(
0
.
3
9
)
(
0
.
4
5
)
42Table IV
The Eect of Incentives on Eort
This table estimates the eect of performance pay on screening eort. Each column reports
results from a separate regression. The omitted category in all regressions is the low-powered
baseline incentive. The dependent variable in column [1] and [2] is the number of loan le
sections reviewed, the dependent variable in columns [3] and [4] is the number of loan le
sections reviewed when loan ocers were required to pay for additional information. The
regressions in columns [1] and [2] include the entire sample, while columns [3] and [4] restrict
the sample to loan evaluations made under the `costly information' condition. All regressions
include a lab xed eect, randomization stratum and week xed eects, as well as dummies
to control for treatment conditions not reported in this table. Loan ocer controls include
age, seniority, rank, education, and indicators for branch manager and business experience.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the loan ocer  session level, the same level
of observation at which the treatment is assigned. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Free information Costly information
Loan le Loan le
sections reviewed sections reviewed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline, omitted
High-powered 0.434* 0.400*** 1.225*** 0.794***
(0.23) (0.14) (0.42) (0.25)
Origination bonus 0.083 0.005 -0.147 -0.156
(0.22) (0.14) (0.40) (0.21)
Loan xed eects No Yes No Yes
Loan ocer xed eects No Yes No Yes
Loan ocer controls Yes No Yes No
Number of observations 14,405 14,675 8,520 8,688
R-squared, adjusted 0.452 0.698 0.266 0.694
43Table V
The Eect of Incentives on Risk-Assessment
This table reports the eect of performance pay on loan ocers' subjective assessment of
credit risk. Each column shows results from a separate regression. The omitted category in
all columns is the low-powered baseline incentive. The dependent variable in regressions [1]
and [2] is the overall risk rating, normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation 1. The
dependent variable in columns [3] and [4] is the normalized sub-rating for all categories that
pertain to the personal risk of a potential applicant. In columns [5] and [6] the dependent
variable is the normalized sub-rating for all rating categories that pertain to the business,
management and nancial risk of a loan applicant. All regressions include a lab xed eect,
randomization stratum and week xed eects, as well as dummies to control for treatment
conditions not reported in this table. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the
loan ocer  session level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Internal rating
Overall rating Personal and Business and
management risk nancial risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline, omitted
High-powered 0.029 0.007 0.012 -0.001 0.054 0.020
(0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04)
Origination bonus 0.145* 0.006 0.132* -0.015 0.157** 0.021
(0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
Loan xed eects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan ocer xed eects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Loan ocer controls Yes No Yes No Yes No
Number of observations 14,405 14,675 14,405 14,675 14,405 14,675
R-squared, adjusted 0.147 0.615 0.137 0.619 0.156 0.600
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48Table X
Heterogeneity in the Response to Incentives
This table examines the interaction between incentive schemes and loan ocer personality traits. In each panel,
the rst two columns report the main eect of the personality characteristic indicated in the panel heading,
the second two columns report interactions. All personality traits are as dened in Table I. Further details on
the measurement of personality traits are available in the Internet Appendix. All regressions control for loan
application xed eects, loan ocer age, rank, gender, education, a lab xed eect, randomization stratum
and week xed eects. Regressions in Panel B additionally control for all measured personality traits and
non-reported categories of the BFI personality test. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the loan
ocer  session level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Screening Eort
Sections reviewed Information credits spent
Main Eect Interaction Main Eect Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Career Concerns
A.1 Age -0.05*** (0.01) -0.12***
High-powered 0.39 (0.84) 0.00 (0.02) 7.43* (4.39) 0.02 (0.03)
Origination 0.87 (0.86) -0.02 (0.02) 9.14** (4.49) -0.07 (0.05)
R-squared, N 0.500 6,102 0.42 3,828
A.2 Private Banker 0.39** (0.17) 1.50*** (0.45)
High-powered 0.78** (0.33) -0.69 (0.43) 1.59* (0.85) -0.71 (0.79)
Origination 0.31 (0.31) -0.46 (0.42) 0.72 (0.94) -1.76** (0.75)
R-squared, N 0.456 14,405 0.284 8,520
Panel B: Personality Traits
B.1 Impatience -0.54 (0.55) -0.35 (1.03)
High-powered 0.29 (0.28) 2.94*** (0.75) 1.26** (0.62) 2.99 (2.27)
Origination 0.15 (0.30) 1.33 (0.92) -0.23 (0.70) 2.40 (1.96)
R-squared, N 0.503 6,102 0.436 3,828
B.2 Risk-aversion 1.53*** (0.32) 1.36** (0.57)
High-powered -0.87 (0.86) 1.33 (0.89) 3.63** (1.74) -1.66 (1.51)
Origination 1.28 (0.88) -1.21 (0.93) -0.08 (1.37) 0.96 (1.12)
R-squared, N 0.504 6,102 0.421 3,828
B.3 Optimism 0.44 (0.31) -0.19 (0.67)
High-powered 0.55* (0.29) -0.79 (0.56) 1.43** (0.64) -2.27** (1.10)
Origination 0.33 (0.30) -0.98 (0.92) 0.06 (0.73) -4.08*** (1.31)
R-squared, N 0.500 6,102 0.424 3,828
B.4 Conscientiousness -0.37 (0.29) -0.93 (0.59)
High-powered -5.93*** (1.70) 1.77*** (0.46) -2.88 (4.76) 1.55 (0.95)
Origination -6.84*** (2.15) 1.93*** (0.59) -0.28 (4.69) 0.41 (0.91)
R-squared, N 0.507 6,102 0.421 3,828
B.5 Overcondence -1.00** (0.45) -1.12* (0.67)
High-powered 0.54* (0.28) -0.21 (0.86) 1.22* (0.68) 1.26 (1.35)
Origination 0.05 (0.29) 1.14 (0.84) -0.26 (0.82) 1.25 (1.04)
R-squared, N 0.500 6,102 0.427 3,828
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Figure 1: Loan Ocer Performance. This gure shows the distribution of loan ocer per-
formance, measured by the average percentage of correct decisions per session under the Baseline
treatment. The line plots the Kernel density of the performance distribution. We dene a correct
lending decision as approving an ex-post performing loan or declining an ex-post non-performing loan.
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(a) Accuracy of Lending Decisions
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(b) Protability of Lending Decisions
Figure 2: Learning During the Experiment. This gure examines the presence of learning
eects over the course of the experiment by plotting (a) the percentage of correct decisions by the
total number of experimental sessions completed and (b) the prot per approved loan by the number
of experimental sessions completed. A correct lending decision is dened as a loan ocer correctly
approving a performing loan or correctly declining a loan that became delinquent. The dashed lines
and shaded areas are Kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions and 95% condence intervals.
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(b) Performing Loans
Figure 3: Distribution of Internal Risk Ratings. This gure plots the distribution of internal
ratings assigned to loans evaluated under the baseline treatment. Panel (a) shows the distribution
of risk-ratings for the sample of non-performing loans and loans that were declined by the Lender
ex-ante; Panel (b) plots the distribution for performing loans. Vertical lines show the median of the
distribution. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects equality of distributions at 1% (p-value<0.001).
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